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 Preface 
This paper is part of the ongoing evaluation of the reform in the Norwegian 
employment and welfare administration and funded by the Norwegian Research 
Council. The paper is part of the sub-project in this evaluation named Welfare model, 
governance systems and NAV (the Norwegian acronym for the employment and Welfare 
administration), headed by Professor Tom Christensen. The paper was presented at 
5TAD – The Future of Governance in Europe and the US, Workshop 6: Collaboration, 
Hybrid Governance and Networking. 11-13 June 2009, Washington DC
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 Sammendrag 
Mange offentlige organisasjoner blir mer komplekse og framstår som hybrider i sine 
bestrebelser på å håndtere mange og delvis motsetningsfulle strukturelle og kulturelle 
elementer på samme tid. Ulike generasjoner av reformer i offentlig sektor knyttet til 
New Public Management (NPM) og reformer i etterkant av NPM har forsterket disse 
utviklingstrekkene og ført til at det oppstår lagdelte strukturelle og kulturelle trekk som 
stammer fra ulike reformtiltak. Dette notatet behandler følgende problemstillinger: 1) 
analytisk, hvordan kan vi fortolke den økende tendensen til hybride organisasjonsformer 
ut fra et transformativt perspektiv?, 2) empirisk, hvordan utvikler hybride 
organisasjonsformer ut fra ønsket om å balansere NPM reformer og reformer i etterkant 
av NPM med særlig vekt på å håndtere spenningen mellom kontroll og autonomi?; og 3) 
basert på det transformative perspektivet og innsikt i moderne reformer i offentlig 
sektor generelt, hvordan kan vi forstå en moderne reform med typiske hybride trekk? 
Den reformen vi fokuserer på er NAV reformen, en av de største forvaltningsreformene 
i Norge. Den ble utformet i perioden 2001-2005 og gjennomføringen har pågått fra 
2006. Dataene er basert på personlige intervju med aktører som har stått sentralt i 
reformprosessen, offentlige dokumenter og ulike studier som har undersøkt ulike sider 
ved reformen 
.
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 Summary 
Public organizations are increasingly hybrid and complex, trying to attend to numerous 
and partly conflicting structures and cultural elements at the same time. The different 
generations of public sector reforms – NPM and post-NPM – have accentuated these 
features, resulting in multiple-layer structural and cultural features from diverse 
generations of reforms. The paper covers the following main research questions: 1) 
analytically, how can we interpret the increasing tendency towards hybrid governance in 
terms of a transformative approach; 2) empirically, how is hybrid governance 
developing out of attempts to balance NPM and post-NPM considerations, particularly, 
how is it addressing the dichotomy between control and autonomy?; and 3) based on 
the transformative approach and insights into modern public sector reforms in general, 
how can we understand a modern reform that is typically hybrid in character? The case 
we focus on is the largest public sector reform ever in Norway, the reform of the 
welfare administration, which was decided on in the period 2001–2005 and 
implemented through 2009. The data are based on personal interviews with elite actors, 
public documents and various studies evaluating the reform.
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 Introduction 
Public organizations are becoming increasingly hybrid and complex as they try to attend 
to numerous and sometimes conflicting ideas, considerations, demands, structures and 
cultural elements at the same time (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). One reason for 
this is that modern representative democracies are institutionalizing administrative 
policies and implementing different generations of modern public sector reforms at an 
accelerating pace. The NPM reform wave, seen as a reaction to the challenges and 
problems of the «old public administration», and the post-NPM reform wave, seen 
partly as a reaction to the negative effects of NPM, are together resulting in a complex 
sedimentation or layering of structural and cultural features (Olsen 2009a, Streeck and 
Thelsen 2005). In the course of this process certain elements of structure and culture 
have remained relatively stable, others have become stronger or even institutionalized, 
and others still have been reorganized, modified or deinstitutionalized (Røvik 1996). 
Looked at from the point of view of a transformative approach, taken from 
organization theory, we may interpret the increasing complexity of public sector 
organizations – and we focus here on the central civil service – as the result of a 
dynamic interaction of instrumental, cultural and environmental features (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2001a and 2007b). First of all, it may be seen as the product of 
instrumental organizational design by political and administrative leaders (Egeberg 2003) 
or else of negotiation processes, reflecting heterogeneity in public organizations (March 
and Olsen 1983). Second, it may be related to a long process of cultural evolution, 
where «statesmanship’ via «critical decisions» creates a complex and distinct culture that 
interacts with structural development (Selznick 1957). A third possible option is 
pressure from the technical or institutional environment, which may also increase 
complexity (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a, Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
There may be diverse reasons why structure and culture become more complex. At 
one level complexity may indicate instrumentality and rationality. Since societal and 
political-administrative problems and demands are complex, the structure and culture 
must also be complex if it is to respond effectively and efficiently. But complexity may 
also indicate flexibility – diversity in the structure and culture of a public organization 
may make it more able to relate to different parts of its own organization and to 
respond to the environment in a differentiated, albeit not necessarily consistent way 
(Brunsson 1989). A thrid way way of looking at complexity is as organized chaos (March 
and Olsen 1976), whereby public leaders have problems using the structure and culture 
in systematic ways. 
Structural complexity in public organizations may be measured according to some 
central dimensions. One is vertical specialization, another is horizontal specialization, and both 
dimensions have intra- and inter-organizational elements (Egeberg 2003, Gulick 1937, 
Simon 1957). Vertical, intra-organizational specialization tells us how formal authority is 
distributed among different levels of the hierarchy. Strong vertical specialization means 
that hierarchical control and coordinative power are divided among many leaders and 
levels. Vertical inter-organizational specialization focuses on the specialization among 
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public organizations. Used in this sense strong vertical specialization may mean 
ministries with a lot of subordinate agencies, while weak specialization indicates more 
integrated ministries. 
Horizontal intra-organizational specialization means internal specialization within 
public organizations – the division of an organization into different departments and 
units, according to principles that Gulick (1937) labels purpose, process, clientele and 
geography. Strong horizontal specialization indicates division into several sub-units. 
Horizontal inter-organizational specialization focuses on specialization among public 
organizations on the same hierarchical level, as, for example, among ministries or 
agencies. Strong specialization means many such units. If we look at all these 
dimensions together we get an indication of how complex a system is. One extreme 
here is strong vertical and horizontal specialization overall, meaning strong proliferation 
and fragmentation, which was typical for the NPM reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001b); the other is low specialization on both dimensions, indicating an integrated 
political-administrative system. Rather than measuring complexity specifically we will 
use these dimensions to determine in what direction our reform is moving. 
Cultural complexity is also part of the equation, but less central to our analysis than 
structural complexity. It is also more difficult to grasp. Strong cultural complexity means 
that there are a variety of informal, cultural norms and values in and among public 
organizations, either because there are many considerations to attend to, or because sub-
cultures have developed or else because cultural norms from different types of reforms 
have been combined. Weak cultural complexity means cultural homogeneity and 
integration – i.e., members of an organization are very committed to its basic cultural 
norms and values and there is a common sense of purpose and a feeling of being in the 
same «cultural boat» (Kaufman 1960, Krasner 1988, March and Olsen 1989, Selznick 
1957). 
Hybrid organizational forms in the public sector may mean different things. They 
may denote multi-structural forms inside ministries and agencies, but they may also 
describe the relationship between ministries and agencies, between the government and 
municipalities, etc. (Kickert 2001, Pollitt et al. 2007). Hybrid is also the term used to 
characterize quasi-governmental organizations that exist at the interface between the 
public and private sector, which may be either market or civil society organizations 
(Koppell 2003). We apply the concept here primarily in its broad sense inside the public 
sector and relate it to the increased complexity produced by several generations of 
administrative reforms. 
We will empirically discuss the processes and challenges of complexity by focusing 
on the classical distinction between political and administrative control on the one hand, and 
institutional autonomy on the other, and relate this to the NPM and post-NPM reforms. 
We will illustrate how the balance between control and autonomy works in practice by 
analyzing the recent major reform of the welfare administration in Norway. Whereas 
NPM as a reform wave was driven very much by the autonomy argument, stressing 
structural devolution and increased distance to executive politicians, post-NPM reforms 
have tended to revive the control and coordination aspects (Christensen, Lie and 
Lægreid 2007). The NPM reforms combined vertical specialization or structural 
devolution with extensive use of the principle of «single-purpose organizations» or 
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horizontal specialization, creating a fragmented system which, it was argued, catered to 
«role purity» (Gregory 2001). Post-NPM reforms, which started in the late 1990s in the 
countries that had been NPM trail-blazers, introduced a combination of vertical 
integration via stronger control measures and greater capacity for the political executive, 
and more horizontal collaboration and coordination in the form of networks, teams, 
projects, etc. (Gregory 2003, Halligan 2006). 
The paper will accordingly cover the following main research questions: 
1. analytically, how can we understand the increasing tendency towards 
hybrid government? Here we base our analytical discussion on a 
transformative approach, with elements from organization theory. We ask 
how a dynamic interaction of structure, culture and environment may 
explain increasing hybridization. Our point of departure is the notion of 
conscious design of complexity by executive leaders, given diverse 
constraints. 
2. empirically, how is hybrid government developing out of attempts to 
balance NPM and post-NPM considerations, in particular the balance 
between control and autonomy? 
3. based on the transformative approach and insights into the dynamics of 
modern public sector reforms in general, how can we understand a 
specific modern reform that is typically hybrid, particularly with regard to 
the major challenges of political-administrative control, accountability, 
professional autonomy and legitimacy. 
The case we focus on is the largest public sector reform ever in Norway, the reform of 
the welfare administration. This reform comprised a merger between the employment 
and pension administrations/agencies and local partnerships between this new 
organization and the social services of the municipalities. The reform was adopted 
during the period 2001–2005 and is being implemented gradually through 2009. The 
data here are based on personal interviews with elite actors, public documents and 
major evaluatory studies of the reform. 
First, we will give a brief overview of what we mean by a transformative approach 
and focus especially on the conditions that lead to more complexity. Second, we will 
describe how NPM and post-NPM reforms have tended to increase complexity and 
hybridization. Third, we will use the reform of the Norwegian welfare administration to 
show how attempts to balance control and autonomy bring about complexity. Finally, 
we will draw some conclusions and point to some implications. 
A transformative approach and preconditions for 
developing complexity 
Ma i n  e l emen t s  o f  t he  t r an s f o rma t i v e  app roa ch  
According to a transformative approach, public actors involved in decision-making 
processes, reform processes included, are constrained and influenced by three sets of 
factors or contexts (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a and 2007b). We argue that the 
institutional dynamics of reform can best be interpreted as a complex mixture of 
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environmental pressure, polity features and historical-institutional context. These factors 
define how much leeway political leaders have in making choices about a conscious 
design of complexity in public reforms (Olsen 1992). This includes how they are able to 
balance central concerns in NPM and post-NPM reforms like central political and 
administrative control on the one hand, and agency and professional autonomy on the 
other. 
A  s t r u c t u r a l -  i n s t r umen ta l  p e r spe c t i v e  
Structural, constitutional and polity factors related to a structural-instrumental perspective 
determine the potential of leadership decision-making and the structural and other 
formal constraints to which it is subject. Such factors go some way to explaining how 
leaders handle reform processes (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Olsen 1992). These 
constraints may be very tight, potentially giving leaders strong hierarchical control but 
not much leeway or flexibility. But they might also be rather loose, not giving leaders 
and other actors much direction but instead a lot of potential discretionary influence. 
The main features of the polity, the form of government and the formal structure of 
decision-making within the political-administrative system may all affect a country’s 
capacity to realize administrative reforms. 
From a structural or instrumental point of view, reforms may generally be seen as 
conscious organizational design or reorganization (see Egeberg 2003). This perspective 
is based on the assumption that political and administrative leaders use the structural 
design of public entities as instruments to fulfil public goals. Major preconditions for 
this are that the leaders have a relatively large degree of control over reform processes 
and that they score high on rational calculation or means-end thinking (Dahl and 
Lindblom 1953). There are two major versions of the instrumental perspective – a 
hierarchical one and a negotiational one – with the former denoting an unambiguous 
command structure and clear goals, while the latter focuses on heterogeneity and 
conflict between different interests (Allison 1971, March and Olsen 1983). 
Hierarchical design of complexity. The first question is to what extent and how political 
and administrative leaders can design complexity so as to achieve a balance between 
control and autonomy. In principle, if a political and administrative leadership has a lot 
of control over reorganization or reform processes; it can pick and choose whichever 
solutions it likes. So why should it choose an organizational model or reform that is 
rather complex? A rather simple answer is that this is seen as the most rational solution 
to the challenges confronting the public organization (March and Olsen 1983). Both the 
internal conditions and the external constraints may be so demanding and complex, or 
even turbulent, that the executive leadership is eager to diversify the structure, so as to 
cater to both control and institutional autonomy at the same time. So there is 
congruence between complex constraints and complex structure or reforms (see 
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). In pluralist polities it might be easier to garner support for 
a robust and complex design that implies some ambiguity regarding constraints on 
decision-making processes and that allows different substantive outcomes than for a 
design that dictates precise policy outcomes (Olsen 1997). 
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Second, still presupposing that the leadership scores relatively high on rational 
calculation, complexity may signal flexibility on the part of the leaders. They may not 
wish to act in certain ways, even if they pretend to do so (Brunsson 1989), or they may 
try to obscure their motives and actions, and a complex organizational structure gives 
them more leeway to do so. Complexity might, for example, mean a more loosely 
coupled organization (March and Olsen 1976). Complexity might mean «creating noise’ 
in decision-making processes (Cohen and March 1974), covering one’s tracks, or like the 
fox, having at least two exits from the hole. This motive for creating complexity may be 
related to leaders’ practice of using myths and symbols to balance control and 
autonomy, pretending to some audiences that the control side is important, while others 
will hear the autonomy message. Another alternative is to emphasize control in certain 
periods and autonomy in others, or else to have certain parts of the organization 
specializing in control, while others focus on autonomy (Brunsson 1989, Cyert and 
March 1963). 
Third, if leaders lack insight and score low on rational calculation, complexity may be 
the result of arbitrary or temporal processes (March and Olsen 1976). Leaders may wish 
to develop the public organization in a systematic way in a certain direction, but do not 
succeed in this endeavor because they lack the ability to see the connection between 
means and ends. This limited cognitive capacity could result in a lot of reorganization or 
patchwork reforms, which in themselves generate complexity. Sometimes organizations 
work according to a «fire alarm model» (Gormley 1989), producing diverse 
organizational developments. Balancing control and autonomy may tend to be seen 
from the outside as systematic when it is in reality more coincidental. 
Negotiations furthering complexity? If we further explore the control aspects, 
heterogeneity may be an explanatory factor for complexity. Heterogeneity inside 
government, diverse institutionally based interests and a tug-of-war between different 
leaders may create the background for organizational complexity (March and Olsen 
1983). Added to this is the heterogeneity in the environment of public organizations. 
There may be at least three different ways to arrive at solutions under such 
circumstances. After sounding-out processes and negotiations (Olsen 1972), there will 
be a compromise, and in that way complexity can reflect a compromise between central 
control and institutional autonomy. This may further hierarchical control but also imply 
solutions that are not entirely wanted. In other words, leaders have to balance control 
and preferred solutions on the one hand, and participation and legitimacy on the other. 
Or there could be a winning coalition, for example attending simultaneously to control 
and autonomy, which often will further hierarchical control. There could also be a 
«sequential attention to goals and quasi-solutions of conflicts’, meaning for example that 
control may be emphasized at one point in time, to cater to some actors, while 
autonomy becomes predominant at other times, to cater to other constituencies, 
without any overall thought for consistency (Cyert and March 1963). Overall, this 
solution may both enhance and obstruct hierarchical control. 
Complexity is not only created by heterogeneity of participants as such, but also by 
different interests and perspectives, depending on the institutional position and outlook 
the different participants have (March and Olsen 1983). So structural complexity may 
relate to the wide range of different interests playing into a reform process. Central 
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political and executive leaders may be the main proponents of control measures, while 
agency and state-owned enterprise leaders, not to mention public leaders on the regional 
and local levels, may work hard to further autonomy measures. 
A  cu l t u r a l  p e r spe c t i v e  
A cultural perspective specifies another set of constraints. According to this perspective 
public organizations develop core informal norms and values slowly in an 
institutionalization process, leading them to evolve distinct cultures. Different countries 
have different historical-cultural traditions and their reforms are «path dependent», 
meaning that national reforms have unique features (Krasner 1988, Selznick 1957, 
March and Olsen 1989). A culture that «infuses» formal structures with values may be 
very distinct and strong, having a strong influence on decision-making behavior, but it 
may also be vague or loose, or even inconsistent with a lot of sub-cultures, and 
therefore have less influence. 
The reform roads taken reflect the main features of national institutional processes, 
where institutional «roots» determine the path followed in a gradual adaptation to 
internal and external pressure (Selznick 1957). The greater the consistency between the 
values underlying the reforms and the values on which the existing administrative 
system is based, the more likely the reforms are to be successful (Brunsson and Olsen 
1993). When public organizations are exposed to reform processes, the reforms 
proposed must, according to a cultural perspective, go through a cultural compatibility 
test. Here the institutional leadership may have a double role in reforms. On the one 
hand it will have to «administer the necessities of history» (March 1994), meaning being 
sensitive to cultural traditions and guarding historical paths. On the other hand, it will 
also be assigned the task of gradually changing cultural traditions in order to adapt to a 
new and changed environment and context. This endeavour may involve socialization, 
training, and manipulation of symbols aimed at changing the attitudes of the 
organization’s members. 
NPM as a reform wave was rather compatible with the traditional culture in Anglo-
American countries, which was why reforms fell on more fertile ground there than in 
many Continental-European and Scandinavian countries, which proved to be more 
reluctant reformers because of less cultural compatibility (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 
Pollitt, Van Theil and Homburg 2007). As post-NPM reforms emerge, the interesting 
question arises of whether the new reforms have a path-dependency related to the old 
administrative system or to NPM. Some studies construe post-NPM reforms as a return 
to the cultural norms and values of the traditional Weberian and centralized system, 
while others emphasize that NPM has created a new trajectory that makes it difficult to 
return to the «good old days» – i.e. NPM has a constraining effect on post-NPM 
reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). 
In principle the development of common cultures in public organizations should 
decrease complexity, particularly if culture is the «institutional glue» that holds an 
organization together or if culture means a lot for organizational development. So how 
could complexity then be related to cultural development? One answer is that even if a 
culture is seen as common, it is also complex, reflecting a variety of informal norms and 
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values. So the cultural path and appropriateness developed are also complex, probably 
more complex the older the public institution is. Kaufman (1976) points to the 
argument that many of the older public organizations have historical paths and complex 
layers of cultural norms and values that have been added to over time, and that these 
features are central in explaining why these organizations have become so old – they 
have developed a kind of «institutional smartness». This smartness is not only related to 
overall common cultural norms and values but also to competing types of 
appropriateness existing side by side in the public sector (Boin and Christensen 2008). 
An example from Norwegian administrative history may be used to illustrate this 
point. The relationship between ministries and agencies in Norway since 1814 has gone 
through periods of ebb and flow (Christensen 2003). Starting out with a lot of 
ministerial control, the weight shifted to autonomy values when the first agencies were 
established in the 1840s. In the period between the two world wars, the executive 
leadership tried to control the agencies more, through an agency model that was 
somewhere between the integrated solution and the independent agency model. After 
WWII there came a wave of more agency independence again, while the 1970s brought 
more control. This was again followed by more autonomy, as NPM measures were 
introduced during from the 1990s, while in the last 5–10 years the pendulum has swung 
back again as post-NPM reforms have brought in more elements of control and 
coordination again. This example shows both the swings between control and 
autonomy, but also an increasingly complex relationship. 
If we move away from the premise of cultural homogeneity, we can also argue that 
complexity in public organizations may reflect different sub-cultures. Even though there 
are major common cultural features, there is also cultural diversity. So complexity may 
result from simultaneously catering to sub-cultures favoring control and autonomy. 
An  env i r onmen ta l  p e r spe c t i v e  
A third set of factors relates to an environmental perspective. According to Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) the environment of public organizations may be divided into two parts, 
the technical and the institutional environment. The technical environment is mainly 
about efficiency, production and exchange. NPM may be seen as the optimal solution to 
widespread technical problems – i.e., it is adopted to solve problems created by a lack of 
instrumental performance or by economic competition and market pressure. In this 
instance NPM reforms are adopted not because of their ideological hegemony but 
because of their technical efficiency. The technical environment may exert strong 
external determinism, meaning that an organization has to adapt to demands from the 
environment (Olsen 1992), for example when a university faces major demands for cut-
backs from the responsible ministry. In other instances environmental constraints may 
be rather loose and diverse, causing few actual limitations on decision-making in an 
organization. 
The institutional environment has a less instrumental character and is more about 
assumptions concerning the appropriate organizational structure, internal culture, 
recruitment policy, demography, etc. A country may adopt internationally based norms 
and beliefs about how a civil service system should be organized and run simply because 
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these have become the prevailing doctrine. NPM had its origins in certain Anglo-Saxon 
countries and international organizations, like the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), where a kind of reform myth took hold, became 
ideologically dominant and diffused all over the world (Scott 2007, Czarniawska and 
Sevón 1996). This diffusion process implied isomorphic elements – i.e., it created 
pressure for similar reforms and structural changes in many countries (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Isomorphism can be seen as a deterministic, natural process engendered 
by common dominating norms and values. 
Myths develop in the institutional environment and spread to individual 
organizations, groups of organizations or whole political-administrative systems. These 
myths in the institutional environment may have a strong deterministic potential, as in 
the TINA (There Is No Alternative) principle. But sometimes the institutional 
environment may be less influential, either because myths are not as strong or because 
there is a complex pattern of myths and counter-myths. 
Myths and diffusion are not only associated with NPM reforms, but also with post-
NPM reforms. The counter-myths that have drummed up support for a new generation 
of reforms highlight the negative aspects of NPM, claiming that NPM is destroying the 
welfare state and benefiting the few, undermining political control, creating mistrust, 
reducing legitimacy and producing ambiguity and less transparency, not to mention 
symbols connected to external threats like terrorism, pandemics and tsunamis 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). The images associated with the «whole-of-
government» (WG) or «joined-up government» (JUG) initiatives that have characterized 
post-NPM reforms readily bring to mind the idea of repairing and putting back together 
something that is broken, has fallen apart or become fragmented (Gregory 2003). In this 
sense their benefits are taken for granted, and very few actors would dispute the 
advantages of an integrated governmental apparatus or of taking anything other than a 
wide and collaborative view. 
Environmental factors and complexity. How might the technical environment explain the 
development of more structural and cultural complexity in public organizations? For 
one thing the technical environment is diverse and possibly turbulent, which would be 
reflected in internal complexity (Scott and Davies 2006). Balancing control and 
autonomy could be the result of attending to different actors and institutions in the 
technical environment. NPM is furthered by demands from the technical environment, 
for example related to crises. This was the background to the reforms in New Zealand 
that began in 1984 (Aberbach and Christensen 2001, Boston et al. 1996, Gregory 2001). 
Another possibility is that a public organization will grow more complex because the 
demands on the organization from one or several outside sources have become more 
complex.  
Reform myths coming from the institutional environment are in general believed to 
have the effect of making public organizations isomorphic, i.e. more similar in form, at 
least on the surface (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The argument behind this is that myths 
develop in the institutional environment and spread rather quickly to other populations 
of organizations, where they primarily function as «window-dressing», creating an image 
of the organization that increases its legitimacy (Brunsson 1989). NPM was based on the 
myths that a large public sector was bad, that structural devolution and differentiation 
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were good, that competition and choice were better than control and regulation, etc. 
The complexity that NPM brought was also a complex set of ideas and ideology 
(Boston et al. 1996). When post-NPM came along a set of counter-myths gained 
support: namely, that an integrated public system was better than a fragmented one, that 
coordination was better than competition, that central capacity and standardization were 
better than institutional autonomy and variety (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). This 
created an even more complex system of ideas, because not all NPM ideas were 
deinstitutionalized, but continued to exist alongside post-NPM ideas. 
Some observers believe that myths are created and spread consciously by certain 
groups from different organizational fields (Sahlin-Anderson 2001). These are narrower 
kinds of myths, often labeled «institutional standards’ or «prescriptions», and public 
organizations choose a combination of them. These institutional standards are 
sometimes used in conflict with other myths or practices, through processes of partial 
imitation, editing and translation (Røvik 2002). According to the myth theory, increased 
complexity has to do with public organizations imitating and using diverse institutional 
standards (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2007). This can either happen if myths of 
control are imitated in one period and myths of autonomy in another, or if the 
organization simultaneously imitates myths catering to control and autonomy, as is 
evident in both NPM and post-NPM reforms. Complexity could also result from 
organizations combining different reform elements containing both control and 
autonomy measures (Røvik 2002). Røvik (1996) also emphasizes that successful 
imitation may have something to do with combining decontextualization – i.e. arguing 
that a broad reform has potential everywhere – and contextualization – i.e. arguing that 
a given reform perfectly fits local conditions. If this is the case, local adaptation results 
in a complex combination of different reform elements. If we relate this to NPM and 
post-NPM reforms, complexity may have resulted from a pragmatic adaptation to the 
two reform waves, whereby countries, sectors and institutions pick institutional 
standards from organizational fields and combine them in a «patch-work-like» way. 
Based on this way of reasoning, one can say that increased complexity has something 
to do with public organizations imitating and using institutional standards. This can 
either happen if, say myths of control are imitated in one period and myths of autonomy 
in another, causing them to co-exist, or the organization can simultaneously imitate 
myths catering to control and autonomy. 
The  dynam i c s  o f  t h e  t r an s f o rma t i v e  app roa ch  
There is a dynamic relationship between the reform features described in the three 
views stated, and an important question is how much political leeway they offer. 
International reform trends like NPM and post-NPM have global potential, but they can 
also be transformed in the diffusion process when they encounter national contexts, so 
that they are not only seen as myths without behavioural consequences (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Røvik 1998). While nationally based reforms have unique features, they are 
also influenced by international trends. The main reform ideas, solutions, methods of 
implementation, practice and effects that come from outside change when they 
encounter different political-administrative and historical-cultural contexts (Olsen 1992). 
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Such transformation may reflect a lack of compatibility between reform content and 
national institutional norms and values (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). A kind of «editing» 
of reform ideas takes place as they are put into operation and come face to face with 
existing national ideas and practice (Røvik 1996, Sahlin-Andersson 1996) or else a 
reform «virus» manages to penetrate a country’s administration only after a certain 
period of time (March and Olsen 1983, Røvik 1998). 
Thus, the transformative perspective is not only about combining and blending 
different perspectives but also about translation: co-evolution, dynamic interplay and 
processes of mutual dependency between reforms, structural features, culture and 
environmental pressure (Christensen and Lægreid 2007b). If we regard administrative 
reform purely as a meeting between external pressure and national constraints and 
strategies, we lose sight of important aspects of the process. The reforms are 
constrained by structural, cultural and environmental features but they can also in 
themselves change such features. Thus, reforming the public administration is a twofold 
process where it is important to stress the dubiety of making a clear distinction between 
reforms and their determinants (cf Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). The reforms 
are at one and the same time both a product of cultural, structural and environmental 
features and a cause of change in those features. Translation transforms both what is 
translated and those who translate. National administrations have the potential to 
transform reform ideas in widely different ways. Some of these translations may be 
regarded as strategic adaptations (Oliver 1991), others as determined by the situation or 
the process, while others still may be seen as an expression of how robust existing 
administrations are. The translation of post-NPM reforms is subjected to different 
approaches in different countries and policy areas. 
Summing up, a transformative approach can be formulated in three different variants 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007b, Olsen 1992). First, we can start with international 
doctrines, ideas and reform movements and focus on how they are filtered, modified, 
translated and interpreted by two national processes: domestic political-administrative 
culture, and instrumental choices made by political and managerial executives 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). Second, we can focus on administrative reforms as a 
complex interaction between different features. Starting with design and conscious 
reforms one can examine how they are transformed when they encounter cultural 
constraints and external pressure (Roness 1997, Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Third, 
one can take cultural features as a starting point and examine how the conditions 
emphasized within the other perspectives (instrumental design and external pressure) 
are translated and filtered within established norms and rules (Roness 1997). 
These three sets of factors or contexts constraining and facilitating the actions of 
leaders in reform processes can be seen as analytically equal. Our position in this paper 
is, however, that the structural-hierarchical constraints will be the main explanatory 
factors in a reform. Many studies of national and comparative administration seem to 
indicate that leaders are not only formally designated to make the most important 
decisions in public organizations, but they also in fact do so, whether these are internal 
decisions, like those concerning administrative reforms, or more externally oriented 
policy decisions (Christensen and Lægreid 1998 and 2002, Egeberg 2003, Lægreid and 
Olsen 1978, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). What we therefore do in this paper is to take 
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the importance of hierarchical steering –in this instance as a mechanism for developing 
complexity through reforms aiming to balance control and autonomy – for granted, and 
discuss the other factors, like negotiative structural factors and cultural and 
environmental factors in terms of whether they limit or further potential hierarchical 
control. 
The hierarchical design of complexity may be either strengthened or modified by the 
other contexts represented by the three other supplementary perspectives. In the best of 
all worlds, political and administrative leaders will further a reform catering to a complex 
balance between control and autonomy, and they will receive support from a variety of 
different stakeholders, thus increasing the reform’s legitimacy. Furthermore, they will be 
supported by cultural norms and values and symbols that present the complex design as 
modern and good. At the other extreme, hierarchical based design of complexity may 
become mired in complex negotiations, may encounter a resistant culture and unwilling 
professions, and may have to deal with counter-myths. All this could ruin or deeply 
modify the original intentions of the executives. 
In reality, as we often discover in comparative reform studies, hierarchically 
controlled reform usually has less difficulty controlling the participants than the 
problems and solutions (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b and 2007a, Pollitt and 
Bouckert 2004). Relatively often heterogeneity is used to enhance hierarchical control, 
or compromises are struck that make it possible to stay the course. Leaders often have 
the upper hand in manipulating symbols, but not always enough to stop cultural 
resistance. Concerning the access structure, the structure of problems and solutions, 
leaders often have problems either of defining clearly what they would like to do or in 
anticipating the effects of the reforms they propose; sometimes, for instance, they 
underestimate the cost of reforms. All this makes it easier for other actors to enter into 
the negotiations and to further their own interests and push for their solutions, whether 
on the basis of their institutional/structural position or on the basis of their culture and 
professional background. 
NPM and post-NPM reforms: increasing complexity 
and hybridization 
When New Public Management was introduced in the early 1980s in Australia and New 
Zealand it was intended as an alternative to and confrontation with «old public 
administration», which was seen as representing a centralized, integrated and big 
government model (Boston et al. 1996, Gregory 2001, Halligan 2001). The main 
message from the NPM entrepreneurs, often with clear ideological and symbolic 
overtones, was that governments and public sectors around the world not only had to 
be scaled back, but also fundamentally restructured. The structural model proposed was 
one of increased specialization and increased fragmentation, both vertically and 
horizontally (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). Vertically it was argued that structural 
devolution was the answer to central capacity problems, because it would allow leaders 
to focus on more strategic questions. There were many new forms of structural 
devolution: giving traditionally agencies more leeway, i.e. moving them further away 
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from the political executive and/or relaxing certain rules constraining their activities; 
establishing more regulatory agencies with strong autonomy based on professional 
values; giving state-owned enterprises strong autonomy, with a lot of barriers to political 
involvement; and giving greater priority to market values. Other measures included 
privatizing public activities related to service and the market, which often involved 
reorganizing agencies or public enterprises. Taken together these NPM reform ideas 
amounted to a rather fragmented model that swung the balance in favor of autonomy 
and created a good deal more complexity. This created problems of political control, as 
shown in comparative reform studies, even though the main argument from supporters 
of NPM is that political control has not been weakened, but works through other 
mechanisms (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
It is well documented that NPM in reality, both overall and in all its different 
varieties in countries and sectors, has been a rather complex and mixed bag of reforms 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001b, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Boston et al. (1996) show 
quite clearly that the underlying economic ideas of NPM reform – informed by new 
institutional economic theories, like rational choice theory, principal-agent theory, 
transaction cost theory, etc – were both ambiguous and contradictory. They point out 
that there were both centralizing and devolutionary elements in these theories. Some of 
the centralizing ideas were related to theories on contracts, which were seen as necessary 
to give the central leaders some control after structural devolution. And during the last 
two decades of NPM it has become increasingly clear that devolution and deregulation 
have been coupled with re-regulation and more scrutiny and control. The biggest flaws 
of NPM were probably its efforts to divorce management from policy (Kettl 2006). 
When the first post-NPM measures emerged in Australia and New Zealand in the 
late 1990s, they were primarily seen as a reaction to the effects and implications of 
NPM-related reforms (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007, Gregory 2003, Halligan 
2007). Two types of challenges seemed to be important. One was the undermining of 
control and central capacity that NPM had brought. Now it was time for the executive 
politicians to take back some of that control and increase their own capacity to solve 
societal problems. The measures used were to vertically integrate some of the agencies 
and enterprises again, either by dissolving some agencies and integrating their activities 
in the ministries, or by establishing more controls and imposing more constraints on the 
agencies and state-owned enterprises. Another measure was to strengthen central 
political capacity by employing more political advisors at the ministries and PM’s offices. 
Other factors that led to the «whole-of-government» efforts were problems with 
delivering on the promise of increased efficiency and concerns after 9/11 about terrorist 
threats or other global problems, like tsunamis and pandemics (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007a). 
The horizontal challenge was seen as even more important than the vertical, because 
having a lot of sectoral pillars or silos was seen as obstructing the solution of cross-
sectoral problems. The strongly promoted NPM principle of «single-purpose 
organizations» came to be regarded as negative because it had led to a lot of horizontal 
specialization and fragmentation and to turf-wars among competing public 
organizations (Gregory 2003). The political and administrative leadership in those 
countries came up with several new coordinative measures that were easier to 
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implement than reversing structural devolution: It established more cross-sector 
collaboration between political and administrative leaders in the central government 
apparatus. These took the form of programs, projects and networks, and there were 
even some structural mergers. The political and administrative leadership even tried to 
get the two main measures to interact, i.e. more hierarchical control of the different 
types of cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination. 
Post-NPM reforms are in some ways more culturally oriented than the NPM reforms 
(Halligan 2007). That is particularly the case in Australia, where the concept of «value-
based management» has been important. While NPM ushered in a much more 
specialized cultural perspective, whereby every public organization should develop its 
own culture, the post-NPM message is that there should be more emphasis on a holistic 
perspective. The credo now is that civil servants and public institutions should be 
developing some kind of collective notion that they are in the same boat, and that there 
should be some kind of ethical standards and a focus on the ethos of the civil servants 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007a, 2009b). 
If we look at the «old public administration», which existed in many countries up 
until the late 1970s, the system was simple and integrated in both a vertical and 
horizontal way. NPM had made that system much more complex, through the vertical 
and horizontal specialization process. But Weberian features from the old system were 
kept and blended with NPM, so that although it was a reform that was supposed to 
promote autonomy, it only partly delivered on that point. Nevertheless, we can say that 
NPM tilted the balance away from control and towards autonomy (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007a). When the post-NPM reforms came along, the balance tilted back 
towards more control. The post-NPM reforms play out more along the horizontal 
structural dimension, with more integration, including cultural integration. In other 
words they have added to and modified the NPM reforms, making the total system 
features more complex. 
Adding complexity: The Norwegian Welfare 
Administration Reform 
The  No rweg i an  r e f o rm  con t ex t  and  t he  ma i n  
f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e f o rm  
To take a closer look at the dynamics of transforming the civil service in a way that adds 
complexity, we will describe and analyze how control and autonomy as well as other 
considerations are balanced in the largest Norwegian administrative reform ever: the 
reform of the labor and welfare administration. This reform incorporated central 
elements from both NPM and post-NPM, leading to more structural and cultural 
complexity. We will both analyze how increased complexity has emerged in the process 
and content of the reform and also relate complexity to the preliminary effects of the 
reform and the challenges it raises. 
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Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multi-party state that since the early 1970s has 
been ruled by minority governments, but this changed in 2005 when a center-left 
majority coalition came to power. Collectivist and egalitarian values are important, 
consensus-orientation is crucial, the level of internal conflicts is low, and corporatist 
arrangements are well developed (Christensen 2003). 
Norway is seen as a rather reluctant reformer when it comes to taking NPM reforms 
on board (Olsen 1996). Its reform efforts all started with some symbolic adaptations to 
NPM in reform programs in the late 1980s, while the 1990s gradually brought more 
autonomy for agencies and state-owned enterprises, and a devolution reform of the 
regulatory agencies was launched in 2003 (Christensen and Lægreid 2007c). After that, 
however, post-NPM elements started to emerge, as seen in the major hospital reform 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006) and in attempts to modify the regulatory reform 
and the reform of the immigration administration (Christensen, Lægreid and Norman 
2007). 
Norway has a significant tradition of local self-government (Fimreite and Lægreid 
2009). Local authorities with their own elected democratic institutions have wide 
competencies. The Norwegian welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and 
universal in the world, with a large public sector. In the Norwegian model, welfare 
policy is decided mainly at the central level but adapted to local needs and circumstances 
and implemented by local government. Local government is responsible for social 
welfare, elementary schools, care of the elderly and primary health care and thus 
constitutes a major part of the public sector both in terms of the number of employees 
and in terms of financial resources. National insurance/pensions and the labor market 
administration have, however, traditionally been a central government responsibility. 
The relationship between central and local government is a mixture of political 
decentralization, based on the principle of local autonomy, and administrative 
decentralization, based on the principle of delegated authority. 
Generally, specialization by sector is very strong in the Norwegian central 
government administration (Christensen 2003). The sector ministries have a strong 
position based on the principle of ministerial responsibility. The same sectors have also 
dominated the political and administrative structures at regional and local government 
levels, with rather weak coordinative efforts. 
In Norway administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected co-
operation across sectors, reflecting strong sector administrations. Major reform 
measures have first and foremost been directed at the vertical, sector-based dimension 
of public administration and paid less attention to horizontal coordination problems 
between policy areas and sectors (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). It has been difficult 
to establish cross-ministerial cooperation between policy areas (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007a, Fimreite and Lægreid 2008). 
The comprehensive reform of the welfare administration was initiated in 2001, 
adopted in 2005, and after an interim period of a year, began implementation from 2006 
through 2009. The main element in the reform is the following: it was decided that the 
employment administration, represented by the Directorate of Labour (DOL), should 
be merged with the National Insurance Administration (NIA) into one new labor and 
welfare agency (NAV) represented on all levels (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 
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2007). It was also decided that a new local frontline service should be organized – a one-
stop shop – resulting from a new partnership between NAV and the locally based social 
services. The local partnership was meant to combine control and formalization with 
flexibility and variety. 
The reform process was rather complicated and deviated from other reforms in one 
particular respect, namely, the unusual role of the parliament – the Storting (Christensen 
2008). Normally it is the political and administrative executive that initiates reforms, but 
in this case it was the Storting. The Storting expected the government to come up with a 
model involving one institution or sector for labor and welfare. The government’s initial 
proposal, however, was to keep most of the existing fragmented structure. The Storting 
sent the proposal back, resulting in a political defeat for the government. In the next 
phase the government established a public commission, mainly in order to use 
professional arguments to convince the Storting of its position. The commission also 
thought that basically a version of the established fragmented structure was the best 
solution. But the incoming minister in a merged Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs 
changed the course of action. Ignoring the commission’s proposal, he worked closely 
with the Storting and got it to accept a proposal that implied a partial merger, leaving 
responsibility for social services to local government, but in a partnership with the 
merged central agencies. 
Two of the three main goals of the reform are connected to NPM, namely increased 
efficiency and increased user-friendliness. The idea of the merger and local partnerships 
was to achieve economies of sale, while the new local partnership and the «one-door 
policy» was designed to increase user-friendliness; this was also related to the third goal 
of getting more people into the workforce, particularly the multi-service users. NPM 
was also evident in the internal organization of the new central NAV agency: a large 
internal provider unit («agency within an agency») was created, while the rest of the 
central NAV agency was to function as a kind of strategic purchaser (Askim, 
Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2008 and 2009). The new organization is also 
equipped with a performance management system. 
The main background to the whole reform was to introduce more coordination 
mechanisms into a fragmented structure – a typical feature of post-NPM. The merger 
finally decided on was a watered-down version of the original plan, however, since it 
proved politically impossible to fully include the social services. Nevertheless, this was 
still the largest sectoral merger ever to have taken place in the Norwegian central 
administration, so the holistic aspect of the reform was certainly central. 
The reform will probably tilt the balance in the direction of more central control and 
less local autonomy, but it is too early to say for sure. A new and stronger ministry, 
including all the relevant services has been established, together with a new and merged 
agency with a strong administrative apparatus that is also represented at the regional and 
local levels. This new organization has formed local partnerships with parts of the social 
services locally and will potentially be dominated by the NAV organization (Fimreite 
and Lægreid 2008). In addition, a further reorganization took place after the local 
partnerships had been established, creating regional pension units and reducing the task 
portfolio, responsibilities and resources of the local offices. 
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T rans f o rma t i on  and  c omp l ex i t y  –  p r o ce s s  and  
r e f o rm  con t en t  
Hierarchical design and complexity. The hierarchical design of complexity through reforms 
may be influenced by lack of rationality and control. Overall, more comprehensive 
reforms are the most difficult to design and control, while narrower and partial ones can 
often be decided on and implemented more easily (Wright 1994). The NPM and post-
NPM reforms seem to present different types of challenges to leaders trying to control 
the structural design of public organizations. NPM-related reforms constituted a major 
challenge to the control of public leaders, because of their fragmented institutional 
structure, which potentially undermines leaders’ authority and power, while post-NPM 
reforms both challenge the control side, by creating capacity problems, and make 
rational calculation difficult because leaders have to figure out how to combine and 
integrate complex structures. 
The development of complexity as a result of modern reforms may take different 
paths in different countries, depending on political-administrative structures and 
traditions, not to mention environmental and temporal contexts. Typical of the NPM 
trail-blazers like Australia, New Zealand and the UK is that they are all Westminster-
type systems, which means it is quite easy to get reforms decided on and pushed 
through parliament (Hood 1996). Hence the preconditions for hierarchical design seem 
to be fulfilled, at least on the control side, which makes them different from the 
Scandinavian countries. But executive leaders in those countries have had general 
problems with rational calculation, partly because of the comprehensiveness of the 
reforms, partly because the underlying basis in economic theory was not solid enough 
(Boston et al. 1996). 
What about the hierarchical design of complexity in the Norwegian welfare reform 
described? In the first phase of the process the administrative leadership obstructed the 
reform the Storting wanted, and got the support of the executive political leadership, 
which was internally divided. Overall the executive leadership scored low on control of 
the process and its legitimacy took a blow when the Storting rejected its proposal for 
keeping the welfare administration divided and sent it back. In the next phase, the main 
actor was a clever and proactive minister who, as the leader of a reorganized ministry 
overseeing all three sectors involved – employment, national insurance/pensions and 
social services – was in a strong position. Through skillful political negotiation he 
managed to get most of the other actors on board – the Storting, the sectors involved 
and the organization for the local authorities. 
Neither the executive actors nor the main actors in the Storting scored high on 
rational calculation or organizational thinking. The main goals for the reform were 
decided on early on, but the weakness of this part of the process became evident when 
both sides, argued that their solution – a disintegrated and an integrated one, 
respectively – would further the same goals. The model finally chosen was also a 
complicated solution, combining increased coordination with control potential, with 
new strong local units. It lacked clarity concerning the possible effects, and it was partly 
modified during the implementation process, because the establishment of regional 
pension units implied moving personnel from the local level. 
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Negotiations furthering complexity. Structural complexity may reflect the wide range of 
different interests playing into a reform process. Central political and executive leaders 
are likely to be the main proponents of control measures, while agency and state-owned 
enterprise leaders, not to mention public leaders at the regional and local levels, may 
work hard to further autonomy measures. When the NPM reforms began, they were 
backed in many countries by a winning coalition of different actors (Gregory 2001). 
One might say that when the post-NPM reforms started, the winning coalition and 
compromises behind NPM were renegotiated in many countries. Actors who had been 
skeptical when NPM started gained influence, while formerly reluctant supporters of 
NPM changed course after seeing the consequences of the reforms and became part of 
a new winning coalition favoring post-NPM elements (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 
2007, Gregory 2003, Halligan 2006). 
Negotiations are definitely an important factor contributing to complexity in modern 
reforms. This characteristic is most typical in non-Westminster parliamentary systems or 
in presidential systems (Wright 1994). Overall, negotiations make reforms and their 
underlying systems more complex, because of the necessity of attending to different 
interests that focus on different parts of the reforms. Even though NPM moved public 
organizations in the direction of more autonomy, NPM reforms also contained 
heterogeneous elements, which means they lent themselves well to compromises. Some 
actors were primarily interested in structural devolution, market-related elements and 
competition, while others focused more on the control and contractual aspects of the 
reforms. The emerging post-NPM coalition includes actors focusing on both vertical 
integration and horizontal coordination. 
The organizational model finally chosen in our case reflects this tendency towards 
negotiation and compromise, i.e. a compromise was actually a main precondition for 
reaching a final decision. Often the new complex structures contain elements that are 
directly connected to the diversity of the actors designing them. In the labor and welfare 
reform process the incoming minister managed to resolve a stand-off between the 
executive and the parliament, by getting support for a compromise between control and 
autonomy. By merging two sector organizations and making local partnerships, he 
catered to the actors who wanted to see more coordination, but he also reassured the 
actors who still wanted strong central control, arguing that the merged agency would 
probably strengthen that control. In addition he also took account of the interests of 
actors who favored strong local government and maintaining the division of tasks 
between the central state and the municipalities, by establishing local partnerships and 
keeping the social services a local responsibility. 
Cultural complexity. The cultural complexity of public organizations becomes rather 
evident when modern reforms are introduced, because NPM reforms represent a 
challenge to the traditional culture in the public sector (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). 
Although the introduction of competition, performance systems and service-orientation 
under NPM challenged the culture of the traditional administrative system, the old rule-
steering was preserved, producing a mixed administrative culture in many countries. 
Post-NPM reforms attempted to revive some of the cultural norms and values of the 
«old public administration» related to control and coordination, without completing 
replacing the NPM culture (Christensen and Lægreid 2008 and 2009a). The challenge 
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now was to culturally «reprogram» civil servants to think more about control, 
coordination and common culture again. This increased the cultural complexity at the 
«cultural cross-roads». 
Our reform case also illustrates this increasing cultural complexity. Culturally 
speaking the challenges of this reform are huge, because it sets out to mold three 
different and distinct cultures into a new identity and culture. The former employment 
service, which had been modernized and become more results-oriented, was merged 
with the more traditional, rule-oriented Weberian culture of the national insurance 
service. And as if this were not sufficient, the reform also brought a third factor into the 
cultural equation, the locally based and discretion-oriented social services. 
Environmental complexity. NPM was furthered by the combined influences of the 
technical and institutional environments. Sometimes real crises, like the economic crises 
in Australia and New Zealand, were responsible for the adoption of NPM (Aberbach 
and Christensen 2001). But even in cases where there was no particular crisis, NPM 
simply became the prevailing ideology. Supported by neo-liberal politicians and anti-
Keynesian economists, it became so dominant and widespread that people began to 
assume that it was «natural» to take NPM on board and to take for granted that it 
provided the answer to most problems in public organizations (Self 2000). The same 
types of mechanisms occurred with post-NPM. In some cases there were actual 
problems or crises, related to lack of efficiency, problems of cross-sector coordination, 
particularly in the face of terrorism, pandemics and tsunamis, all making it easier to 
argue for more control and coordination (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). At the 
same time, the symbols of reform changed so that control and coordination were now 
held to be better than structural devolution and role purity. 
The influence of a combination of environmental factors is also evident in the 
welfare reform. The reform certainly constituted a response to real problems of too 
many people on pensions and social benefits, creating efficiency problems. But it was 
not evident why such a large and complex reform was the answer to these problems. It 
was also characterized by symbols of unity and local partnership. In the first phase the 
Storting insisted on introducing a unified welfare administration but remained short on 
specifics because this would have revealed that there were internal divisions between 
strong supporters of central control and local autonomy. But it was difficult for the 
political executives to handle such a potent political symbol. The minister’s main 
symbolic card was «local partnership», which sounded good and had the necessary 
ambiguity. It also combined central standards – mandatory by law and minimum 
standards for individual services and tasks – with local autonomy, and allowed local 
offices to choose the leadership model and decide how many services and tasks could 
be included. All this made the model easier to sell politically. 
I n c r ea s i ng  c omp l ex i t y  -  eme rg i ng  e f f e c t s  and  
cha l l enges  
Implementation of the reform at the central level – i.e. merging the two sectors – began 
in 2006, but implementation at the local level is taking place more gradually through 
2009 with a number of new local offices opening every year. This makes it difficult to 
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judge the overall effects, particularly at the local level, but some preliminary effects and 
challenges are emerging. Implementing a reform as big as this is a major challenge, 
especially when unexpected environmental shocks occur in the middle of the 
implementation. It might be compared with rebuilding a ship on the open sea. When the 
implementation phase started the weather was quite smooth, with an economic boom 
and very little unemployment, but then the weather changed suddenly as the result of 
the financial crisis so that in the middle of the reorganization the organization has had 
to handle rapidly increasing unemployment. This has produced a lot of stress in the new 
organization as well as in the political environment surrounding the reform. 
Let us start by focusing on the three main goals of the reform. The first deals with 
getting more people into the workforce and off different types of benefits. The 
preconditions for achieving this goal have changed dramatically with the financial 
recession. Until late 2008, the unemployment rate in Norway was so low – 1.8. percent. 
– that central respondents in an evaluation of the reform conducted that year pointed 
out that it was difficult to discern whether the reform had any effect (Askim, 
Christensen Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). Since then unemployment has increased 
sharply, and even though it is still only 2.5 percent (in March 2009), the new welfare 
administration has found this rise difficult to deal with. Its inability to provide benefits 
to the newly unemployed fast enough became a hot political issue in Norway in the early 
months of 2009, and has allowed critics to portray the reform as a failure. Obviously the 
routines and resources of the new welfare administration are not yet good or established 
enough to respond to such a challenge, coming at a time when street-level bureaucrats 
who were previously specialists are struggling to acquire more general competencies and 
to implement a more complex system. Clearly, the organization has little slack to cope 
with emerging crises and this has undermined the legitimacy of the new welfare 
administration. 
The second goal of the reform was to increase efficiency. Overall, this goal has not 
been the central concern, which is understandable given the Norwegian cultural 
tradition. One major argument here was that economy-of-scale effects could be 
achieved by merging two sectoral organizations and developing local partnerships. 
However, two other factors have run counter to this: firstly, that the merger has made 
the new organization very complex, and secondly, that strong unions have ensured that 
all employees kept their jobs after the reform. So far it looks as if this complexity is not 
doing much to enhance efficiency, and the financial crisis has shown that the new 
organization is vulnerable. The reorganization that the implementation involved, i.e. 
moving people from the local level to regional pension units, thus increasing 
complexity, also potentially undermines efficiency on the local level, while potentially 
increasing it on the regional level. 
The third goal, increasing the user-friendliness of the system, is closely connected to 
the efficiency goal. Overall, the new organization has had problems delivering on this 
goal because of complexity problems. Clients have struggled to find their way around 
the new organization and have lost contact with their former case-worker. Call centers 
are not working well, and ICT personnel are struggling with coordination efforts. What 
has emerged during the implementation process is that the main group of clients the 
reform focused on – the multi-service users, encompassing around 15 percent of the 
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clients – have probably got better and more efficient service because of greater 
coordination effects. However, through the «reorganization of the reorganization», 
namely establishing regional pension units, some of that effect has been lost on the local 
level, although one-service pension clients are probably still getting a better service. 
What about the effects of the two main changes in the reform, the merger and the 
local partnerships? The implementation of the merger seems to have gone rather 
smoothly on the central level, with good collaboration between the two former sectors – 
employment and pensions. One reason for this may be that the overall organization is 
rather complex, which has allowed the former sectors to keep some of their structures 
in the new organization, particularly in the big cities. Whether this will be an advantage 
in the longer term is another question. The relationship between the ministry and new 
welfare agency also seems to be working well, although because attention from the 
political leadership is high in such a salient policy area particularly during a crisis, this 
may potentially strain the relationship. The relationship between the leadership of the 
agency and the NDU – the central provider unit – is also functioning well, even though 
the «agency within an agency» solution is somewhat strange and the division of labor is 
unclear particularly concerning developmental questions. 
The reform’s main problems and challenges are related to its most important 
element, the new local labor and welfare offices. Preliminary evaluations seem to point 
to both positive signs and major tensions (Alm Andreassen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 
2009). The positive signs are that the local political and administrative leadership seems 
to be rather satisfied with the reform and to see it as a partnership that excludes the 
dominance of central government locally. One reason for this may be that the reform 
has enabled them to coordinate solving local tasks better; another is that the central 
level is providing more local resources. The employees affected by the reform generally 
seem to support it and think that one of its main achievements has been increased 
collaboration locally, an effect of the main structural changes. But they also point to 
some negative signs related to increased complexity. One is that many employees have 
had to take on partly new tasks (around 70 percent) meaning that they have to acquire 
new competencies that the new organization has had problems providing. Another 
problem and challenge is the enormous task of standardizing the laws and rules of the 
three former sector administrations to form a single system. This concerns things like 
structural solutions for case-work, wage systems, computer systems, etc. A third is to 
create a new cultural identity based on three rather different, sectorally based cultures. 
Conclusion 
Our understanding of institutional change in the case of administrative reform is as a 
combination of robustness and flexibility. Public organizations with institutional 
features do not adapt rapidly or easily either to deliberate executive reform initiatives or 
to shifting external pressure (March and Olsen 1989). There is a kind of layering Streeck 
and Thelsen 2005) or sedimentation process (Olsen 2009a) going on that implies that 
new reforms complement or supplement old reforms rather than replacing them. Old 
and new institutions co-exist and co-evolve even if they are founded on partly 
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inconsistent principles. This means that rather than being dead and replaced by post-
NPM reforms, NPM reforms are being modified and adjusted through the addition of 
new and different reform measures. The result of such a process is increased complexity 
in the organization of the public sector but also increased turbulence, because the trade-
off and balance between different principles tends to change over time, between 
countries and across policy areas. 
Any shift in the balance between autonomy and control must be seen in the 
contested nature of administrative reforms and the limited understanding reformers 
have of the multi-functional nature of public sector organizations and competing 
institutional values, principles and interests (Olsen 2009b). These characteristics, 
together with a weak understanding of the consequences and implications of the 
reforms adopted, tend to encourage a never-ending reform process that makes public 
sector organizations ever more complex hybrids. This is not necessarily unhealthy but 
rather a systemic feature of public sector organizations in which one has to learn to live 
with partly conflicting principles, goals and values in a shifting environmental, cultural 
and structural context. 
Precisely why this increased complexity occurs is, however, contested. Our argument 
is that there is no one-factor explanation and that we have to look for a complex 
mixture of different driving forces. We cannot assume that reform agents have sufficient 
capability, cognitive capacity and power to act as rational actors. Their behavior is 
constrained by different contextual features. Public administrations are reformed in 
organized contexts that are rather complex, and reformers normally have to act within 
such contexts, which constitute the «zone of indifference» that they can operate within. 
Polity, culture and environmental features exert important constraints on deliberate 
organizational design (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a and 2007b). There is no agreed 
upon empirical administrative theory specifying under which conditions one set of 
factors has greater explanatory power than other factors or how their mutual influence 
can be understood (Olsen 2007). We embrace the growing claim that context matters 
(March 2008), but there is still no good theory of context that specifies under what 
conditions different contexts matter (Pollitt 2003). 
There is, however, an increasing realization that there is no panacea for 
administrative reforms and that they must be matched carefully with the needs, 
traditions and resources of each political system (Olsen 2005). Reforms that do not take 
the historical-institutional context into consideration tend to produce new reforms 
rather than better performance. In this paper we have argued that global prescriptions 
for administrative reforms have consistently been interpreted and responded to 
differently depending on national and sector-specific institutional arrangements and 
historical traditions. In addition there is the problem of co-evolution between reforms 
and organizations. Reforms affect the organization of the public sector, but equally the 
organization itself also affects the direction of new reforms. What often happens is that 
administrative reform elements, such as NPM, are translated when they are imported 
into a new context. 
The Norwegian welfare administration reform focused on in this paper was about 
introducing more coordination. But it does not use a «pure» set of post-NPM principles. 
Rather the reform was designed by combining NPM and post-NPM reform elements in 
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a complex mix, albeit with a slant towards post-NPM features. Formal vertical and 
horizontal reintegration or de-specialization is used, blended with NPM instruments for 
performance management systems, purchaser-provider elements, a devolution element 
like strong local welfare offices, etc. The reform was also modified after it was decided 
on, potentially increasing complexity still further, but also increasing tension between 
control and autonomy. This is illustrated by the establishment of new regional pension 
units and moving resources from the local level, which was a centralizing move. 
Overall, the reform studied is both atypical and typical in a comparative national and 
international perspective. It is atypical in the sense that the political leadership had to 
struggle for control and had, at least to some degree, to submit to the demands of the 
Storting. This was one of the main reasons why the process became more complex, 
because the minister had to strike a compromise to get the reform through. The process 
is typical in scoring low on organizational thinking, which is changing, ambiguous and 
not well founded, despite the inclusion of experts. Actors share common goals but 
propose widely differing routes for arriving at them. It is still difficult to say what effect 
the local partnerships may have on the main goals. 
Preliminary effects show that there are a lot of challenges and problems with the new 
complex organizational model, but also advantages. The problems are connected to the 
complex way the main goals are being realized, but are also related to the more specific 
problems of standardization that a structural and cultural merger and collaboration 
poses. The advantages are the increased collaboration that a structural merger of this 
kind brings and also the flexibility offered by a complex structure. 
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